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78 percent felt pressured to compromise integrity in a job-related situation (York, 2007) . This result is not new -in 1981, 77 percent of NCOs answered the same way to the same question (York, 2007) . More recently, interviews with Senior NCOs and current Air War College students provided further evidence that minor integrity violations appear across the service (SNCO Interview, 2014; AWC Interview, 2014) . The purpose of these interviews was not to assign blame on the individuals involved, but rather to establish that the Air Force faces a pervasive, historical problem with acting on its Core Values in daily operations. The Air Force and the nation expect all Airmen to execute sound moral and ethical reasoning, identify the difference between right and wrong even in ethically gray areas, and act in accordance with the right choice.
However, the majority of reasons people make immoral or unethical choices is not due to faulty reasoning -additional external factors largely drive unethical behavior. Sean Hannah and Bruce Avolio, researchers on moral decision-making, concluded that, "by just focusing on capacity for moral judgments, we in effect leave about 80 percent of the variance in ethical behavior unexplained" (Hannah and Avolio, 2010, p. 292) . In essence, moral reasoning only accounts for about 20 percent of the variability in ethical versus unethical behavior. They theorize that moral action involves three factors -ownership of the problem, perceived ability to carry out a decision (efficacy), and the courage to act. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The development of this paper relied on scholarly articles, historical case studies, and focus groups with senior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The scholarly research was primarily used to inform the authors' understanding of ethical decision-making, both in general and in relation to the military environment. The reviewed research articles ranged from well-established psychological frameworks such as Kohlberg's developmental model of ethical decision-making (Kohlberg, 2008) , to published works with a specific focus on ethics in the Air 
DRIVERS OF THE CORE VALUES GAP
The issue of moral decision-making has been well researched in academia, and provides a useful backdrop for solving this problem. Lawrence Kohlberg, an American psychologist, experimentally derived a model for moral development based on the cognitive reasoning one employs in making moral decisions and solving ethical quandaries (Kohlberg, 2008) . How one thinks through moral and ethical quandaries is referred to as moral reasoning. The study of moral decision-making has largely been focused on moral reasoning, and assumed it is the main factor leading to moral action (Hannah and Avolio, 2010) . However, researchers have concluded that the majority of reasons people make immoral or unethical choices is not due to faulty reasoning, but attributable to other factors (Hannah and Avolio, 2010; Mazar, Amir, and Ariely, 2008; Gino et al., 2011; Gino, Ayal, and Ariely, 2009; Coleman, 2009; Bradley, 2009) . There is often a distinct difference in the way people think they should act versus the way people actually act (Ajzen, 1991) . Culture, environmental factors, individual factors, and psychological mechanisms all influence an individual's moral reasoning and moral action (Haidt and Kesebir, 2010) . Addressing all possible factors contributing to the Core Values Gap is outside the scope of this article; therefore, the discussion which follows focuses on four external factors which contribute to the Core Values Gap and can be mediated through actionable recommendations for leadership.
The four factors identified that drive the Core Values Gap are: (1) a zero-defect standard, Command-Directed Investigation (CDI) describes organizational leadership -and, subsequently, organizational culture -paralyzed by a zero-defect standard. The CDI concludes that in much of the culture, "an unrealistic emphasis on perfection drives commanders at all levels to attempt to meet the zero-defect standard by personally monitoring and directing daily operations and imposing an unrelenting testing and evaluation regimen on wings, groups, squadrons, and missile crew members in an attempt to eliminate all human error" (Holmes, 2014, p. D-13) . The report further concludes, "if the system rewards leaders for achieving short-term results at the expense of long-term unit health and leader development, it teaches the following generations of leaders to adopt successively harsher approaches-further increasing the alienation and dissatisfaction of subordinates" (Holmes, 2014, p. D-15) . Not only did the zero-defect standard contribute to unrealistic expectations that drove unethical behavior, but it also had a long-term detrimental effect on the morale of the unit and hindered future leader development.
While it is tempting to view the Malmstrom case as an outlier, varying degrees of this zero-defect organizational culture can be found in other areas of the Air Force. It occurs in metrics and reports such as Defense Readiness Reporting Systems and training statistics; it is evident during inspection preparation with the pressure to perform perfectly during inspections.
As the US Air Force becomes a "one-mistake Air Force" during the ongoing manpower and resource reductions, the appearance of perfection is perceived to be essential to career progression. To ensure the overall ethical health of a unit, commanders must steer organizational culture away from a zero-defect standard that perpetuates the Core Values Gap.
Misapplication of the Wingman Concept
All Airmen recognize a Wingman as a fellow Airman who looks out for another Airman.
The value of fostering an Air Force culture of being a good wingman is almost self-explanatory; it encourages Airmen to look out for and take care of one another, both on and off duty. When correctly applied, this makes for an easily understandable guide for behavior, even in the most challenging circumstances. However, a dangerous misapplication of the Wingman Concept at the unit level encourages violations of the Core Values in spite of standards for mission accomplishment. The Wingman Concept can lead an individual to reason that it would be better to protect a fellow Airman from potential punitive action than to report a violation of the Core Values. In this situation, individuals face a dilemma as loyalty to peers may conflict with loyalty towards the organization.
A prime example of this misinterpretation is the repeated reports of cadets cheating at the US Air Force Academy. In May 2007, eighteen cadets were expelled or submitted their resignations as a result of cheating on a weekly exam (Wasley, 2007) . These cadets failed to make the connection between their decisions and the impact to their organization's missioninstead, they opted to be "good Wingmen" by covering up each other's integrity violations.
Even though those involved were cadets, unethical behavior would likely continue into the operational Air Force. For example, it was discovered that at Malmstrom AFB, many of those who participated in cheating established their network and participated in unethical behavior while at the US Air Force Academy (Holmes, 2014) . The toleration of Core Values violations under the guise of being a good Wingman is a trend that unit leadership must actively combat. They may report to the IG anonymously or request whistleblower protection, but the IG and members must also "promptly advise" the AFOSI and SF of suspected criminal misconduct" (AFI 90-301, 2012 ).
Gaps Between Core Values Education and Training
These institutions and conventions aim to connect the Core Values to mission accomplishment but create strong disincentives for Airmen faced with ethical decisions in practice. Ethics training by the SJA and IG fails to provide motivation to report on misconduct observed other than implied threats of negative action for failing to report. In any case, Airmen who make a report to the IG may find themselves as subjects or witnesses in a criminal investigation under AFOSI or SF depending on the decision of the investigative agency. (AFI 44-121, 2011) . In an Air Force that competitively selects those who earn the right to pursue a military career, these policy choices at the senior leadership level foster courage to act morally by alleviating, at varying degrees, the threat of negative consequences for honesty. However, because immunity and safety board confidentiality may only be granted after an investigation has begun, these programs provide no incentive to Airmen to report misconduct.
The ADAPT self-identification program encourages reporting, but it is limited to reporting one's own substance abuse. These laws and policies are reactive in nature and are unable to balance the disincentives that exist for Airmen to report Core Values violations. Research suggests that enhancing moral ownership, efficacy, and courage can bridge the gap between moral thought and moral action (Hannah and Avolio, 2010) . It is moral ownership, moral efficacy, and moral courage that overpower influential drivers and lead to appropriate moral action. Hannah and Avolio (2010) outline how to enhance and develop these characteristics. They state that ownership is enhanced by modeling and interacting with subordinates -in essence, "leadership by walking around" -and engaging in ethical discussions.
HOW TO CLOSE THE CORE VALUES GAP
They suggest that dilemmas be debriefed and discussed using real-world, work-related examples.
To improve moral courage, leaders should coach followers through moral dilemmas and delegate ethical challenges to followers or include them in the decision-making process. Finally, efficacy is developed by providing increasingly more challenging ethical opportunities or examples (Hannah and Avolio, 2010) . In sum, in order to bridge the gap between moral reasoning and moral action, leaders must actively seek to model ethical behavior, delegate and debrief dilemmas, and reinforce ethical and moral action. The Core Values Check, in effect, embeds Integrity, Service, and Excellence into the Air Force's "driving force" for ethical and moral behavior (Paine, 1994) . It encourages Airmen to check key decisions with the Core Values and is a way of reminding individuals that morals matter. It also pairs the Core Values and mission accomplishment together into a mutually dependent decision-making process for Airmen to internalize and employ on a daily basis. More importantly, Airmen utilizing this tool can realize that individual moral decisions have an effect on organizational success or failure.
Step 2: Equip Commanders
In order to disseminate the Core Values Check to all Airmen, the first step will be to incorporate it in training and education at all commanders' courses. Squadron commanders in particular are key centers of gravity in implementing leadership concepts. At each level of training, commanders must be taught or reminded how to build and implement this framework as it relates to daily operations in their respective units. From there, commanders can pass the framework on to flight commanders, who in turn pass it to element leaders and NCOs, who continue the progression down to every Airman. The Core Values Check concept will guide thinking and likely lead to further discussions of ethical dilemmas at all levels.
There are several tangible ways that leaders can operationalize the Core Values Check. Step 3: Develop a Toolkit
The Core Values Check is an integral start to changing the organizational culture to focus more on ethics and moral action. In order to foster moral action leaders must model moral action with stories of real events and descriptions of the decision-making process and resulting action.
All Airmen need practice resolving ethical and moral dilemmas in order to develop the skill; thus, it is imperative that leaders delegate minor dilemmas. This allows for practice in ethical decision-making with oversight and mentorship from leaders. It is also important to debrief real dilemmas. Leaders can do this in many ways: from formal reviews of CDI investigations, talking about real dilemmas, to discussing minor infractions and near misses. Finally, leaders are encouraged to find creative solutions to reinforce moral and ethical behavior. Leaders should examine the processes in their units that may be reinforcing unethical behavior or punishing honesty and integrity. For example, a commander may set up ways to reward ethical behavior or self-reporting with "good catch" programs or awards. Leaders are key to closing the Core Values Gap; however, it can be a daunting challenge for a leader to independently generate ideas on how to operationalize the core values.
To mitigate the impediment of a "blank canvas," it has been proposed to develop a toolkit for commanders. Lt Col Gigliotti (2014, pp. 15-16) recommended the development of a resource toolkit for commanders to lead their officer development programs. This toolkit could be created by a future Air Force Ethics Office or the Center for Character and Leadership Development (CCLD) at the US Air Force Academy (Gigliotti, 2014, p. 13) . The only cost would be the time in which it would take to develop the resource; and it would be available for commanders and units to reference as needed, thereby avoiding the simple addition of more things to the schedule. Step 4: Reform institutions Several simple reforms to existing Air Force-wide processes will reduce barriers to reporting ethical infractions and free commanders to shape their organizational culture according to the Core Values.
Encourage reporting of systemic issues. By utilizing the authority and structure of the IG program and making a policy change to AFI 90-301, Inspector General Complaints Resolution, senior leaders can create a system that will empower Airmen to report systemic misconduct and integrity violations before they become major scandals affecting the entire organization. This reform will establish limited protection for voluntary disclosures to a member's first sergeant, commander, or installation IG personnel of a member's participation in, or failure to report, a crime against the United States when the purpose of the disclosure is to prevent further crimes against the United States. By applying the model of the Air Force's ADAPT self-identification program, Airmen have a direct avenue to positively affect their organization's climate and honestly report their knowledge of misconduct. They will also be encouraged to report because the limited protection will prevent the use of the statement-and any evidence obtained through the statement-against the member in a UCMJ action or as an independent basis for administrative demotion or separation.
To limit the scope of the protection to Core Values investigations, the policy would not apply: (1) if the person were not voluntarily making the statement; (2) if the statement covered a crime or infraction against a victim other than the United States; (3) if the person reporting was predominantly responsible for either soliciting the commission of the infractions or for creating the conditions under which further crimes would continue; or (4) when the person, without proper authority, continues to aid and further the activity in question. Also, much like the exceptions to the ADAPT self-identification program, this policy will also not prevent the commander from using independently derived evidence against the member or prevent the commander from taking action to safeguard Department of Defense assets and personnel, such as reassigning a member from positions of trust or directing a Report of Survey to recover lost or stolen assets. With a system designed to give Airmen the tools necessary to take moral action, commanders will have the ability to positively change their organization's ethical climate.
Investigate root causes of Core Values violations. By applying the model of the safety investigation board, the second policy change will establish a special investigation that may be ordered by the IG or commander with the approval of the command's General Court Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA). This change would apply the principles embodied in the testimonial immunity and safety privilege conventions, a logical model for Core Values related investigations. Under this policy, upon a grant of testimonial immunity by the GCMCA to the relevant subjects and witnesses, the IG may appoint an investigating officer (IO) to conduct an investigation independent of any ongoing or concluded commander-directed or law enforcement investigation to identify root causes affecting systemic, morale, or other problems impeding efficiency and mission effectiveness. The IO will require minimal training or experience in legal investigations, and will more readily be able to perform a root cause analysis in order to provide recommendations to senior leaders. These steps will help develop in all Airmen the characteristics of moral ownership, efficacy, and courage needed to act ethically and morally when faced with a dilemma. Reconnecting the Core Values to mission accomplishment is vital to ensure that Airmen and leaders are empowered to think, act, and educate within an environment that embraces ethical and moral perspectives.
